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TATES' and nations' laws collide when foreign factors appear in a
lawsuit. Nonresident litigants, incidents outside the forum, parallel
lawsuits, and judgments from other jur sdictions can create
problems with personal jurisdiction, choice of law, and the recognition of
foreign judgments. This article reviews Texas conflicts cases from Texas
state and federal courts during the Survey period from October 1, 2007,
through September 30, 2008. The article excludes cases involving federal-
state conflicts, intrastate issues such as subject matter jurisdiction and
venue, and conflicts in time, such as the applicability of prior or subse-
quent law within a state. State and federal cases are discussed together
because conflict of laws is mostly a state law topic, except for a few con-
stitutional limits, resulting in the same rules applying to most issues in
state and federal courts.'
Although no data are readily available to confirm this, Texas is no
doubt a primary state in the production of conflict-of-laws precedents.
This results not only from its size and population, but also from its place-
ment, bordering four states, a civil-law nation, and international shipping.
Only California shares these factors, with the partial exception of the
states bordering Quebec. Furthermore, Texas courts experience every
range of conflict-of-laws litigation. In addition to a large number of opin-
ions on garden variety examples of personal jurisdiction, Texas courts
produce case law every year on internet-based jurisdiction, prorogating
and derogating forum selection clauses, federal long-arm statutes with na-
tionwide process, international forum non conveniens, parallel litigation,
international family law issues, and private lawsuits against foreign sover-
eigns. Interstate and international judgment recognition and enforce-
ment offer fewer annual examples, possibly a sign of that subject's
administrative nature that results in only a few reported cases.
Texas state and federal courts provide a fascinating study of conflicts
issues every year, but the volume of case law now greatly exceeds this
Survey's ability to report on them, a function both of journal space and
authors' time. Accordingly, this Survey period's article focuses on selec-
tive cases.
I. FORUM CONTESTS
Asserting jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant requires amenabil-
ity to Texas jurisdiction and receipt of proper notice. Amenability may
be established by consent (usually based on a contract's forum selection
clause), waiver (failing to make a timely objection), or extraterritorial
service of process under a Texas long arm statute. Because most aspects
of notice are purely matters of forum law, this article focuses primarily on
the issues relating to amenability.
1. For a thorough discussion of the role of federal law in choice-of-law questions, see
RUSSELL WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 649-95 (4th ed. 2001).
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A. CONSENT AND WAIVER
Contracting parties may agree to a forum selection clause designating
either the optional or exclusive site for litigation or arbitration. When a
contracting party sues in the designated forum, the clause is said to be a
prorogation clause, that is, one supporting the forum's jurisdiction over
the defendant. When a contracting party sues in a non-selected forum in
violation of the contract, the clause is said to be a derogation clause, that
is, one undermining the forum's jurisdiction.2 The Survey period pro-
duced one noteworthy case involving a prorogating forum clause-BBC
Chartering & Logistic GmbH & Co. K. G. v. Siemens Wind Power A/S.3
Because the case also involves a forum non conveniens analysis, it is dis-
cussed in that section.4 In addition, two derogating-clause cases are dis-
cussed in the Declining Jurisdiction section below. 5
B. TEXAS LONG-ARM AND MINIMUM CONTACTS
1. Commercial Cases
First Oil, PLC v. ATP Oil & Gas Corp. was an action by a Texas parent
corporation and its English subsidiary against a Scottish parent company
and its English subsidiary over a failed joint venture for North Sea drill-
ing.6 The opposing English subsidiaries first litigated in England without
the parent entities, based in part on choice of forum and choice of law
clauses designating England. When that suit was dismissed, Texas parent
ATP sued in Houston and as a non-party to the joint venture, it was ap-
parently able to circumvent the choice of forum clause.7 First Oil ob-
jected to Texas jurisdiction and ATP responded that the single-business
enterprise rule linked the parent corporation to its subsidiaries' actions in
Texas. The trial court upheld jurisdiction but the court of appeals re-
versed, rejecting the single-business-enterprise doctrine's application8
and finding neither specific nor general jurisdiction.9
The single-business-enterprise issue arose again in Davaco, Inc. v. AZ3,
Inc., where a Dallas federal court dismissed a Canadian corporate defen-
dant for lack of personal jurisdiction.10 In doing so, the judge rejected
the plaintiff's argument that the Canadian corporation was subject to
Texas jurisdiction because of its alter ego relationship with a subsidiary
which apparently had contacts with Texas. The judge did so based on a
choice-of-law rule that corporate alter ego is governed by the law of the
2. See EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 466-69 (3d ed. 2000); James P.
George, Parallel Litigation, 51 BAYLOR L. REV. 769, 912-41 (1999).
3. 546 F. Supp. 2d 437 (S.D. Tex. 2008).
4. See infra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 98-105 and accompanying text.
6. 264 S.W.3d 767, 772 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. denied).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 784 (citing PHC-Minden, L.P. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 235 S.W.3d 163, 175
(Tex. 2007)).
9. See id. at 784-86.
10. No. 3:07-CV-803, 2008 WL 2243382, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 30, 2008) (mem.).
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state of incorporation, which in this case was Quebec for both the dis-
missed parent and the subsidiary."
Parties from the United Arab Emirates figured into two other jurisdic-
tional cases where Texas federal courts (1) found jurisdiction over some
but not all Arkansas defendants for the sale, partly in Texas, of a geneti-
cally defective Arabian horse purchased by a buyer from the United
Arab Emirates, 12 and (2) denied plaintiffs' second motion for service by
mail (after the first mailing failed) on foreign defendants for alleged tor-
ture occurring in the United Arab Emirates. 13
2. Non-Commercial Tort Cases
Olympia Capital Associates, L.P. v. Jackson was an action brought by
Texas investors against defendants operating an offshore hedge fund. 14
In a textbook analysis of Texas law and due process, the court reversed
the trial court's finding of specific and general jurisdiction over one de-
fendant based in New York and affirmed the finding of no specific or
general jurisdiction over the Caribbean defendant. 15
3. Internet-Based Jurisdiction
A number of American jurisdictions, including Texas and the Fifth Cir-
cuit, apply the Zippo sliding scale to assess personal jurisdiction based on
internet contacts. 16 The test breaks down internet use into a spectrum of
three areas. One end of the spectrum finds a defendant clearly doing bus-
iness in the forum based on contracts entered with forum residents; the
spectrum's other end finds passive websites not involving defendant's in-
tentional contact with the forum do not lead to jurisdiction. 17 The spec-
trum's difficult middle involves the forum resident's exchange of
information with defendant's host computer, with jurisdiction based on
the level of interactivity and the commercial nature of the information
exchange. Nine cases during the Survey period considered arguments
where the internet was a basis for specific personal jurisdiction.
In First Fitness International, Inc. v. Thomas, the court found the inten-
tional infliction of tortious actions sufficient to establish specific personal
jurisdiction.' 8 The case arose from defendants Sapp and Thomas making
11. Id.
12. See Al-Qasimi v. Pallone, No. H-08-1523, 2008 WL 4178776 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 5,
2008) (mem.).
13. See Nabulsi v. Nahyan, No. H-06-2683, 2008 WL 1924235 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 29, 2008)
(mem.).
14. 247 S.W.3d 399, 408 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.).
15. Id. at 422.
16. See generally Zippo Mfg. Co. v. ZippoDotCom, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa.
1997). The Fifth Circuit adopted the Zippo test in Mink v. AAAA Dev., LLC, 190 F.3d 333,
336 (5th Cir. 1999). Intermediate Texas appellate courts have used it as well. See Townsend
v. Univ. Hosp., 83 S.W.3d 913 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. denied); Experimental
Aircraft Ass'n, Inc. v. Doctor, 76 S.W.3d 496 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no
pet.).
17. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
18. 533 F. Supp. 2d 651, 657 (N.D. Tex. 2008).
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unauthorized use of domain names to resell nutritional and dietary foods
and supplements under the assumed name "1st Fitness" and others. 19
Sapp's and Thomas's website was registered to a non-existent address in
Florida and used numerous federal trademarks registered to First Fitness
International (FFI). Prior to the Florida address, the website reported its
location as Dallas, Texas.20 Both defendants were also previously author-
ized distributors of FFI and governed by Texas law as stated in their
terms of distribution agreements.21 After terminating their distribution
agreements with FFI, defendants began to market FFI products on their
own without permission, which led to this suit.22
In denying Sapp's and Thomas's challenge to Texas jurisdiction, the
court found that Sapp and Thomas "intentionally infringed FFI's trade-
marks and registered www.lstfitness.net in bad faith in an attempt to di-
vert customers from FFI and trade off FFI's goodwill" knowing those
actions would harm First Fitness in Texas. 23 The court expressly noted
that the record would not likely support personal jurisdiction based on
the defendants' interactive website.24 Instead the court found specific
personal jurisdiction based on defendants' intentional actions directed to-
ward Texas.25
The court in Fowler v. Litman found jurisdiction lacking when Fowler,
a Texas resident, hired Litman, a Virginia attorney, to assist with a copy-
right registration. 26 Fowler found Litman's information on the internet
and called and left a message for Litman.27 Litman then returned
Fowler's phone call determining he could help. 28 Litman instructed
Fowler to complete a form available on the website and also pay a fee
through the website.29 Fowler complied, and Litman mailed him their
agreement. 30 Fowler subsequently sued Bell Helicopter for using the
software he had copyrighted with Litman's help. The suit was dismissed
and the attorneys representing Fowler sued for their attorneys' fees.31
Fowler in turn filed a third-party claim against Litman for negligence in
obtaining the copyright application, and Litman filed a special
appearance. 32
While Fowler's conduct was interactive by completing information on
Litman's website and paying for services on Litman's website, the court




23. Id. at 657.
24. Id. at 657 n.4.
25. Id.
26. No. 05-07-01056-CV, 2008 WL 2815086, at *1 (Tex. App.-Dallas July 23, 2008,









found it lacked jurisdiction over Litman.33 Litman's website did not allow
anyone from his office to respond directly over the internet to any poten-
tial clients and required direct contact to establish an attorney-client rela-
tionship.34 The court explained that Fowler's own conduct in Texas
cannot supply a basis for exercising specific jurisdiction over Litman.35
GJP, Inc. v. Ghosh is one of the Survey period's more thoroughly-ana-
lyzed conflicts cases, both on personal jurisdiction and choice of law.36
Avijit Ghosh was a recent Texas immigrant from England who bought a
red 1967 Jaguar E-type convertible through an online advertisement. 37
Seller GJP was a South Dakota company primarily engaged in the plas-
tering business, but which also owned a dozen Jaguars restored by GJP's
owner.38 Ghosh made the contact from his new home in Houston, but
when the car arrived it did not meet his expectations. 3 9 Ghosh's suit in a
state district court in Houston alleged deceptive trade practices and the
South Dakota seller objected both to Texas jurisdiction and the applica-
tion of Texas law.40 The trial court rejected both arguments, and the jury
found actual and exemplary damages totaling $34,500 and attorneys' fees
of $112,500. 41
The court of appeals analyzed a host of notable cases-both Texas and
national-invoking various jurisdictional standards, but relied primarily
on negative inferences from Michiana Easy Livin' Country, Inc. v.
Holten.4 2 In Michiana, the Texas Supreme Court reversed the lower
courts' findings of personal jurisdiction based only on telephone conver-
sations and held that a nonresident's electronic contacts with Texas would
not support jurisdiction unless they were purposeful as opposed to fortui-
tous. 4 3 The GJP panel found that defendants' acts of advertising on the
internet, coupled with a defendant's personal visit to Texas to complete
the deal, were sufficient for purposeful availment. 44
In other internet jurisdiction cases, Texas courts found jurisdiction
lacking in a defamation claim against a California corporation hosting an
interactive forum website with postings about oil and gas companies in
Texas; 45 a defamation claim against an English company that publishes
research on competing products on its website; 46 a trademark infringe-
33. Id. at *3.
34. Id.
35. Id. at *4.
36. 251 S.W.3d 854 (Tex. App.-Austin 2008, no pet.).
37. Id. at 862-63.
38. Id. at 862.
39. Id. at 865.
40. Id. at 861-62.
41. Id.
42. 168 S.W.3d 777 (Tex. 2005).
43. Id. at 785.
44. GJP, 251 S.W.3d at 872-83.
45. See Triple Diamond Energy Corp. v. Venture Research Inst., Inc., No. 3:08-CV-
0050-M ECF, 2008 WL 2620352 (N.D. Tex. July 3, 2008) (mem.).
46. See Dymatize Enter., Inc. v. Reflex Nutrition Ltd., No. 3:07-CV-907-M, 2008 WL
161021 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 2008) (mem.).
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ment, fraud, and cybersquatting claim against a New York company
whose website allowed customers to complete information forms and
view their medical records online;47 a Deceptive Trade Practices Act
claim against a Florida automobile dealer who sold a vehicle on eBay;48 a
fraud, negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty claim by shareholders
seeking to enforce an environmental remediation indemnity provision ap-
plicable to property located in Texas;49 and a dispute with an Illinois de-
fendant concerning misappropriation of computer-based services.
50
4. Tolling Limitations and Extending Amenability
Perhaps the most newsworthy case of the Survey period goes only indi-
rectly to personal jurisdiction, dealing instead with the tolling period that
extends a non-resident's susceptibility to suit in Texas. Kerlin v. Sauceda
involved mineral interests on Padre Island, with claims from 275 heirs of
the original grantee, Juan Jose Balli.5 1 The defendants were Gilbert Ker-
lin and others who engaged in a series of transactions dating back to
1937.52 Plaintiffs alleged fraud and breach of fiduciary duty.5 3 Two key
arguments were the claimants'(current plaintiffs and their predecessors)
failure to sue over the past forty years was excused under common law
fraudulent concealment and their failure to sue was additionally excused
under the Texas tolling statute that tolls the limitations period for non-
resident defendants under certain circumstances. 54 The trial court held
that Kerlin and the other defendants were all non-residents who satisfied
the tolling statute's terms.5 5 The jury found for plaintiffs on unpaid royal-
ties and related damages, but the trial court denied plaintiffs' request for
an equitable accounting.56 The court of appeals upheld the jury verdict
and reversed the trial court's denial of equitable accounting.5 7
The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that fraudulent conceal-
ment did not apply because plaintiffs could have discovered the existence
of their claims through reasonable diligence.58 The jurisdictional refer-
ence came in the supreme court's rejection of statutory tolling; the court
held that statutory tolling reflected a rule that predated long-arm statutes,
47. See Healix Infusion Therapy, Inc. v. Helix Health LLC, No. H-08-0337, 2008 WL
1883546 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 25, 2008) (mem.).
48. See Choice Auto Brokers, Inc. v. Dawson, 274 S.W.3d 172 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.).
49. See Carpenter v. Exelon Corp., No. 14-07-00149-CV, 2007 WL 3071998 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 23, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that the website
was operated by a holding company with no employees or business operations of any type
and only passively provided information).
50. See Exchequer Fin. Group, Inc. v. Stratum Dev., Inc., 239 S.W.3d 899 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 2007, no pet.).
51. 263 S.W.3d 920, 921-22 (Tex. 2008).
52. Id. at 922-24.
53. Id. at 924.
54. Id. at 922.
55. Id. at 924.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 925-26.
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and that where a nonresident defendant was subject to a Texas long-arm
service, as Kerlin was here, the tolling statute did not apply.59
C. DECLINING JURISDICTION
Even where all jurisdictional elements exist, courts may refrain from
litigating cases involving sovereign foreign governments, cases contractu-
ally directed at other forums, cases in which convenience dictates another
forum, and cases parallel to other litigation.
1. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
The federal Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 60 governs every initial
aspect of suing foreign sovereigns, both in state and federal courts. This
includes personal jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction, venue, and the
law to be applied. UNC Lear Services, Inc. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
involved a breach of contract regarding the repair and maintenance of
defense aircraft. 61 The defendant Kingdom objected to jurisdiction on
grounds of sovereign immunity and moved for forum non conveniens dis-
missal. The district court found that Kingdom had engaged in a commer-
cial activity and thus waived immunity in this case. 62 It further denied the
forum non conveniens dismissal, finding that Texas was a sufficiently con-
venient forum and the likelihood that Saudi law would govern was not
enough to compel dismissal.63
2. Forum Non Conveniens Dismissals
Forum non conveniens-or inconvenient forum-is an old common
law objection to jurisdiction based on significant inconvenience to one or
more defendants. It is also available by statute in the federal system and
many states for intra-jurisdictional transfers that do not require dismis-
sal.64 Where interstate or international case movement is involved, fo-
rum non conveniens is truly jurisdictional because it involves the forum
declining otherwise-valid jurisdiction, as well as dismissing the local case
for re-filing in a distinct forum.
Because intra-federal transfers under 28 U.S.C. §1404 do not implicate
conflicts between states or nations, they are not considered here even
though such transfers may involve significant distances. This article is
limited to inter-jurisdictional forum non conveniens under the common
59. Id. at 926-28.
60. 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (2000); id. at §§ 1602-11 (2000 & Supp. 2008). See Elixir Shipping
Sav., Ltd. v. Peruachaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 267 F. Supp. 2d
659, 662-67 (S.D. Tex. 2003).
61. No. SA-04-CA-1008-WRF, 2008 WL 2946059, at *1-3 (W.D. Tex., July 25, 2008).
62. Id. at *6-14.
63. Id. at *15-24.
64. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2000) is the federal statutory provision for inconvenient forum
objections seeking transfer to another federal court. Texas law provides for in-state venue




law, available in state and federal courts in Texas under the two-part test.
The test requires movant to show the availability of an adequate alterna-
tive forum and balancing of private and public interests favors transfer.
65
Although the Survey period includes two Texas Supreme Court cases,
the lead-off case is from the Southern District of Texas where the court
supplied a keen analysis of forum selection clauses, forum non con-
veniens, and parallel litigation. BBC Chartering & Logistic GmbH & Co.
K. G. v. Siemens Wind Power A/S was a declaratory judgment action for
non-or-limited liability under COGSA, the Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act.66 BBC, a German-based corporation, sued Danish corporation SWP
to avoid liability for cargo damaged while en route from Denmark to
Corpus Christi. SWP filed a parallel suit against BBC in Hamburg, Ger-
many, pursuant to the jurisdictional clause in the parties' contract, and
also filed a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens in the Texas suit.
BBC argued that the court should deny SWP's motion because the juris-
dictional clause, which entitled BBC to file suit in any jurisdiction of its
choosing, is analogous to a forum selection clause, thereby precluding
SWP from arguing that the forum is inconvenient.67
The jurisdictional clause provided that:
All claims against Carrier arising from or in connection with this Bill
of Lading or the underlying contract of carriage shall be brought in
the court of relevant jurisdiction, in Hamburg, Germany with Ger-
man law to apply. Nothing in this clause shall be construed to pre-
vent the Carrier from filing suit in any jurisdiction for claims arising
under or in connections with this Bill of Lading or the underlying
contract of carriage. 6 8
The court held the first sentence was mandatory, binding parties suing
BBC to one exclusive forum in Hamburg but the second sentence was
permissive, authorizing BBC to sue in Hamburg or any other forum (pre-
sumably one with jurisdiction).69 The second sentence-the permissive
forum clause-thus justified BBC's declaratory judgment suit in
Houston.7 0
However, the permissive clause did not preclude SWP from arguing for
a forum non conveniens dismissal. Because the second sentence did not
actually designate a forum, it was not a forum selection clause. 71 The
65. See generally Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gil-
bert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947); McLennan v. Am. Eurocopter Corp., 245 F.3d 403, 423-24 (5th
Cir. 2001). For a list of the private factors, see infra note 74. Texas forum non conveniens
law is multi-faceted. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.051 (Vernon 2008) applies
to personal injury and wrongful death claims. Common law forum non conveniens, in line
with Gulf Oil v. Gilbert, governs all other interstate and international forum convenience
issues in Texas state courts. See In re Smith Barney, Inc., 975 S.W.2d 593, 596 (Tex. 1998).
66. 546 F. Supp. 2d 437, 440 (S.D. Tex. 2008).
67. Id. at 439-40.
68. Id. at 441.
69. Id. at 441-42.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 442.
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court then turned to the traditional multi-step forum non conveniens
analysis, first determining whether an available and adequate foreign fo-
rum existed. 72 Finding that Hamburg was an available and adequate fo-
rum, the court then analyzed the private and public interest factors. 73
The court found that a majority of factors-ease of access to proof, cost
of obtaining witnesses to appear, the language barrier, the lack of a
meaningful connection to Texas-strongly favored dismissal. 74
In re General Electric Co. is an asbestosis claim filed by a Maine resi-
dent who had never been to Texas. 75 Plaintiff Richards worked his entire
life as a mason in Maine and was diagnosed with mesothelioma in 2005.76
He filed suit in a Texas district court in Dallas against General Electric
and more than twenty other defendant companies, including three head-
quartered in Texas.77 The court transferred the case to the multi-district
litigation court in Houston, where seven defendants filed forum non con-
veniens objections.78 Richards argued that if his case had to be re-filed in
Maine, it would be removed to federal court and then transferred to the
Multi-District Litigation Court No. 875 where it would languish, in Rich-
ards's estimation. 79 At the initial hearing, the trial judge asked if the de-
fendants would agree not to remove the case if it were re-filed in Maine.80
General Electric and some other defendants refused to agree to that
term, and the trial judge denied the forum non conveniens dismissal.81
Defendants sought mandamus relief from the Texas Supreme Court,
which set aside the trial judge's ruling and held that the forum non-con-
veniens factors weighed "strongly, if not conclusively, in favor of Rich-
ards's action being heard in a forum outside Texas." '82
72. Id. at 443.
73. Id. at 445.
74. Id. at 445-50. The private factors include: (1) relative ease of access to sources of
proof; (2) availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling and the cost of
obtaining attendance of willing witnesses; (3) possibility of view of premises, if view would
be appropriate to the action; and (4) all other practical problems that make trial of a case
easy, expeditious, and inexpensive. The public interest factors include: (1) the administra-
tive difficulties flowing from court congestion; (2) the local interest in having localized
controversies resolved at home; (3) the interest in having a trial in a forum that is familiar
with the law that must govern the action; (4) the avoidance of unnecessary problems in
conflicts of law, or in application of foreign law; and (5) the unfairness of burdening citi-
zens in an unrelated forum with jury duty.




79. Id. at 684-85.
80. Id. at 684.
81. Id. at 685.
82. Id. at 686-94. A national conflicts survey for 2008 that discusses General Electric,
comments that, "[t]he plaintiff stated that he was seriously ill with asbestosis and that if he
had to litigate in Maine, he would not survive long enough to have his case tried. Indeed,
the plaintiff died before the case was heard by the Texas Supreme Court, but this did not
prevent the court from dismissing his arguments as 'speculative."' See Symeon Symeo-
nides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2008: Twenty-Second Annual Survey, 57
AM. J. COMP. L. (forthcoming 2009).
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In re Pirelli Tire, L.L.C. involved a vehicle rollover in Mexico allegedly
caused by defective tires manufactured in Iowa by a Delaware corpora-
tion headquartered in Georgia.83 A Mexican driver and passenger were
delivering a load of seafood when the truck rolled over, killing the
driver.84 The truck had been purchased two years before in Arkansas
and was used, maintained, and serviced in Mexico from the time of
purchase.85 The driver's wife and son, all Mexican citizens, sued in Cam-
eron County, Texas, where the truck was located for eleven days pending
the sale to the Mexican purchaser. 86 The trial court denied the forum
non conveniens motion but the Texas Supreme Court reversed on a man-
damus writ.87
Plaintiffs argued that Mexico was not an alternative or adequate forum
because Mexican law did not provide for strict liability or survival dam-
ages, and the law severely restricted damages for death.88 They also ar-
gued that Mexico did not have American-style discovery or a jury
system. 89 The Texas Supreme Court rejected these arguments relying on
the Fifth Circuit's decision in Vasquez holding that a Mexican court could
be adequate "if the parties will not be deprived of all remedies or treated
unfairly, even though they may not enjoy the same benefits as they might
receive in an American court." 90 Plaintiffs further objected that a Mexi-
can forum might not be available because Pirelli's concession to Mexican
court jurisdiction might not be enforceable in Mexico. 91 The supreme
court rejected this argument, noting that the trial court could condition
dismissal on a Mexican court's acceptance of jurisdiction.92 The supreme
court found the Texas connection insufficient and further found that the
evidence was primarily located in Mexico and that Mexican policy inter-
ests were paramount.93 Two justices dissented, arguing that the major-
ity's interpretation of the Texas forum non conveniens statute exceeded
its language and the court had improperly invaded the trial court's
discretion. 94
In Hart v. Kozik, the Eastland Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's declining jurisdiction in a custody modification action in favor of
Baldwin County, Alabama, the children's home since 2000.95 Although
the facts make this opinion unremarkable, the court's analysis provides a





88. Id. at 678.
89. Id. at 677.
90. Id. at 678 (quoting Vasquez v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 325 F.3d 665, 671 (5th
Cir. 2003)).
91. Id.
92. ld. at 677-78.
93. Id. at 675-79.
94. Id. at 684-89 (Johnson, J., dissenting, joined by Jefferson, C.J.).
95. 242 S.W.3d 102, 112 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2007, no pet.) (applying the forum non
conveniens rule in TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.207 (Vernon 2002)).
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worthwhile template for arguing or adjudicating the unusual conclusion
of declining jurisdiction in a child custody case.
Other cases include Snaza v. Howard Johnson Franchise Systems, Inc.,
a wrongful death case arising in Mexico, where the court rejected dismis-
sal for re-filing in Mexico and opted instead for transfer to the District of
Massachusetts, 96 and UNC Lear Services, Inc., a sovereign immunity case
discussed above. 97
3. Derogating Forum Selection Clauses
As explained above, forum selection clauses designating jurisdictions
other than Texas provide grounds for declining otherwise valid jurisdic-
tion. In re Lyon Financial Services, Inc. illustrates the presumption favor-
ing such clauses. 98 McAllen North Imaging, Inc. (MNI) entered into two
agreements with Lyon Financial Services (Lyon) to finance the leasing of
magnetic resonance equipment. 99 Both agreements designated Penn-
sylvania as a proper forum, one optionally and the other exclusively. 100
Despite this, MNI sued Lyon in Hidalgo County alleging that Lyon was
charging for equipment that was not yet leased. 10 1 Lyon invoked the fo-
rum clauses but lost in both the trial court and the court of appeals.10 2
The Texas Supreme Court reversed in a per curiam opinion, noting the
strong presumption favoring forum clauses and rejecting MNI's argu-
ments that the clause was overreaching, that the Pennsylvania forum
would be inconvenient, and that Pennsylvania law did not permit MNI's
usury claims.103
In Breakbulk Transportation, Inc. v. M/V Renata, Her Equipment, a
federal court in Houston considered a somewhat vague forum clause pro-
viding that "[a]ny dispute arising under this bill of lading shall be decided
in the country where the carrier has his principle places of business.' 10 4
Parallel litigation was also underway in Germany. The court dismissed
the case in spite of plaintiff's arguments that the clause was permissive,
that Germany was inconvenient, and that German law lessened the
remedy. 0 5
4. Parallel Litigation
Parallel litigation is difficult to define, sometimes meaning identical
lawsuits with exactly the same parties bringing the same claims and some-
times meaning two or more lawsuits that may result in claim preclusion
96. No. 3:07-CV-0495-O, 2008 WL 5383155 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 24, 2008) (mem. op.).
97. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
98. See generally 257 S.W.3d 228 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam).
99. Id. at 230.
100. Id. at 230-31.
101. Id. at 231.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 232-35.
104. No. H-07-2985, 2008 WL 1883790, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 25, 2008).
105. Id. at *3-5.
1032 [Vol. 62
Conflict of Laws
for some or all parties. It occurs both intra- and inter-jurisdictionally and
involves remedies of transfer and consolidation (intra-jurisdictional only),
stay, dismissal, and anti-suit injunction, or, in many cases, allowing both
cases to proceed and using the first-to-judgment to preclude the other.10 6
This article will discuss only parallel litigation involving at least one case
outside of Texas: that is, it will not consider multiple, related actions in-
volving courts all located in Texas. The Survey period had two notable
parallel actions, one retaining the Texas case and the other dismissing the
case for re-filing in the other forum.
The litigation in Rimkus Consulting Group, Inc. v. Cammarata (Rimkus
I) brought two noteworthy opinions to the Survey period. 10 7 The first
was the court's denial of Cammarata's motion for abstention in the Texas
action, seeking deferral to Louisiana litigation.108 The case involved a
non-compete agreement being litigated in a Houston federal court and a
Louisiana state court.
Employee Cammarata signed an agreement with Rimkus, a Texas-
based corporation, which included noncompetition and nonsolicitation
clauses and a choice of law provision specifying Texas law as control-
ling.10 9 Cammarata resigned from Rimkus and formed a competing
company.110
The day Cammarata resigned, he sued Rimkus in Louisiana state court
seeking a declaratory judgment that the noncompetition and nonsolicita-
tion covenants in the agreement were unenforceable. 1 Rimkus filed a
parallel action against Cammarata in a Texas federal court for violation of
the noncompetition and nonsolicitation covenants and to enjoin Camma-
rata from continuing to work in competition with Rimkus during the pe-
riod of the noncompete provision, from soliciting Rimkus employees and
customers, and from using Rimkus's trade secrets.112
Cammarata asked the Texas federal court to abstain in favor of the
Louisiana action where he was plaintiff. The court engaged in a textbook
analysis of the Colorado River doctrine, finding factors weighing both for
and against abstention.11 3 After thorough consideration, the court re-
jected abstention and found that (1) a forum selection clause established
the suitability of the Texas forum, 114 and (2) the resolution of either case
would not dispose of all issues in the other.11 5
106. See generally George, supra note 2; James P. George, International Parallel Litiga-
tion-A Survey of Current Conventions and Model Laws, 37 TEX. INT'L L.J. 499 (2001).
107. No. H-07-0405, 2007 WL 4223434 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 29, 2007).





113. Id. at *5-6.
114. Id.
115. Id. at *6-7. Readers may wonder why this forum selection clause was not disposi-
tive of the issue of the lawsuit's location. Forum clauses can be dispositive if they are
derogating clauses, that is, clauses favoring another jurisdiction and thus disfavoring the
instant forum. This clause was a prorogating clause, which validated the instant forum but
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Rimkus 11,116 equally well-reasoned, came after the Louisiana court
had reached a judgment. The Texas federal court considered the Louisi-
ana judgment's preclusive effect and found room to continue with the
Texas case. 117 This opinion fits under the foreign judgments section be-
low but is better discussed here for the parallel litigation implications.
The Louisiana court had held that under Louisiana law, the noncompe-
tition and nonsolicitation covenants, as well as the choice-of-law and fo-
rum selection provisions in the agreement, were unenforceable.' 1 8
Cammarata then filed a motion to dismiss in the Texas case based on the
Louisiana decision, contending Rimkus's claims regarding the validity of
the noncompetition and nonsolicitation covenants were barred by the
Full Faith and Credit Clause and res judicata. 119 Rimkus argued that the
prior judgment was limited because the Louisiana court was only asked to
declare whether the noncompete and nonsolicitation provisions were en-
forceable under Louisiana law, not to decide the issue of whether the
choice-of-law provisions of the agreement were enforceable under Texas
law. 120
Without resolving the issue of whether the prior ruling was binding
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Texas court concluded that
the prior determination-that the noncompetition and nonsolicitation
covenants as well as the choice-of-law and forum selection provisions in
the agreement were unenforceable-had preclusive effect as to Louisiana
law. 121 However, the Court concluded that it was free to determine
whether those same covenants and provisions were unenforceable under
Texas law.' 22
The court found that Texas law determines the enforceability of choice-
of-law provisions and the analysis of the Restatement (Second) of Con-
flict of Laws (Restatement).1 23 The Restatement applies the state law
chosen by the parties (1) if the chosen state has a substantial relationship
to the parties or transaction, and (2) if the chosen state law would not be
contrary to the fundamental policy of a state that has a materially-greater
interest than the chosen state in determining the issue. 124 After review-
ing the record, the court held that Texas had a substantial relationship to
the parties and the transaction-the parties signed the contract in Texas,
Rimkus is headquartered in Texas, both Rimkus and Cammarata's new
did not give the court the power-short of an anti-suit injunction-to do more than deny
abstention.
116. Rimkus Consulting Group, Inc. v. Cammarata (Rimkus H), 255 F.R.D. 417 (S.D.
Tex. 2008).
117. Id. at 432.
118. Id. at 428.
119. Id. at 429.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 432.
122. Id. at 432-33.
123. Id. at 432.
124. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 187, 188 (1971); De-
Santis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 677-78 (Tex. 1990).
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company advertise and do business in Texas, and Cammarata received
work assignments from Texas and traveled there for training and other
employment-related purposes. 25 Because of this substantial relationship
to the parties and the transaction, and the absence of another state having
a materially greater interest in the enforceability of the agreement, the
court held that the parties' contractual choice of law was enforceable
under Texas law.1 26
Capacitive Deionization Technology Systems, Inc. v. Water & Sand In-
ternational Capital, Inc. was a defensive response to a related lawsuit in
the District of Columbia concerning Capacitive's defaulted business
loans.127 The parties executed several documents during the life of the
loans, and the later documents designated Nevada law and a District of
Columbia forum. Water & Sand filed first in D.C., followed by Capaci-
tive's action in a Dallas state court that Water & Sand removed to federal
court.128 Capacitive contended that the loans were usurious and that the
choice-of-law and choice-of-forum clauses were fraudulently inserted in
the later loan documents to circumvent Texas usury laws. 129 Capacitive, a
Nevada corporation operating out of Addison, Texas, also contended that
Nevada law was unconnected to the transactions. The court did not reach
the choice-of-law issue and instead dismissed the case after examining the
forum clause to assure that its terms included the instant claims.1 30
II. CHOICE OF LAW
Choosing the applicable substantive law is a question, like personal ju-
risdiction and judgment enforcement, involving both forum law and con-
stitutional issues. Understanding these issues requires a clear focus on
basic principles. First, choice of law is a question of state law, both in
state and federal courts. 131 Second, it is a question of forum state law.
Renvoi-the practice of using another state's choice-of-law rule-is al-
most never employed unless the forum state directs it, and, even then, the
forum state remains in control. 132 Third, the forum state has broad power
to make choice-of-law decisions, either legislatively or judicially, subject
125. Rimkus I1, 255 F.R.D. at 433.
126. Id.
127. No. 3:08-CV-0038-P, 2008 WL 2796071, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 21, 2008).
128. Id. at *1-2.
129. Id.
130. Id. at *3.
131. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 497 (1941).
132. The Restatement creates a presumption against renvoi except for limited circum-
stances. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 8 (1971). Although com-
mentators defend renvoi's limited use, they acknowledge its general lack of acceptance in
the United States except in limited circumstances, usually found in statutes directing the
use of renvoi. See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 2, at 134-39; WEINTRAUB, supra note 1, at 88-
94. Texas law provides for renvoi in TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 1.105(b), 2.402(b),
§ 4.102(b) (Vernon 2009), §§ 8.106 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2008), § 9.103 (Vernon 2002).




only to limited constitutional requirements. 133
Within the forum state's control of choice of law is a hierarchy of
choice-of-law rules. At the top are legislative choice-of-law rules, that is,
statutes directing the application of certain state's laws based on events or
people important to the operation of that specific law.134 Second in the
choice-of-law hierarchy is party-controlled choice of law, that is, choice-
of-law clauses in contracts that control unless public policy dictates other-
wise. 135 Third in the hierarchy is the common law, now controlled in
Texas by the most significant relationship test of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Conflict of Laws. 136 This Survey article is organized according to
this hierarchy, that is, statutory choice of law, followed by choice-of-law
clauses, and concluding with choice of law under the most significant rela-
tionship test. Special issues such as constitutional limitations are dis-
cussed in the following section. This grouping results in a discussion that
mixes Texas Supreme Court opinions with those of Texas intermediate
appellate courts, federal district courts, and the Fifth Circuit. In spite of
this mix, readers should of course note that because choice of law is a
state law issue, the only binding opinions are those of the Texas Supreme
Court.1
37
A. STATUTORY CHOICE-OF-LAW RULES
The Survey period offered one significant case involving a Texas
choice-of-law statute. In Krafsur v. Spira Footwear, Inc. the court en-
gaged in a somewhat unusual choice-of-law analysis in which federal law,
and not Texas, determined whether a federal court in El Paso had subject
matter jurisdiction. 138 Spira Footwear is a Delaware corporation located
in El Paso in which David Krafsur and Francis LeVert were former direc-
133. The due process clause is the primary limit on state choice of law rules, requiring a
reasonable or at least a minimal connection between the dispute and the law being applied.
See Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S.
797 (1985); Compaq Computer Corp. v. Lapray, 135 S.W.3d 657 (Tex. 2004); see also RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 9 and cmts. following; SCOLES ET AL.,
supra note 2, at 145-76; WEINTRAUB, supra note 1, at 585-648. Choice-of-law limits under
full faith and credit are now questionable after Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt,
538 U.S. 488 (2003).
134. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(1) and cmt. a. See, e.g.,
Owens Corning v. Carter, 997 S.W.2d 560, 566 (Tex. 1999) (applying an earlier version of
the Texas wrongful death statute, requiring that the court "apply the rules of substantive
law that are appropriate under the facts of the case." TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 71.031 (Vernon 2008) (as amended in 1997).
135. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 ("Law of the State Chosen
by the Parties") allows contracting parties to choose a governing law, within defined limits
as explained infra notes 53-61 and accompanying text. Texas has adopted § 187. See De-
Santis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 677-78 (Tex. 1990).
136. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6, listing the seven balanc-
ing factors for the most significant relationship test.
137. The exception is when a federal court rules on a constitutional issue such as legisla-
tive jurisdiction or full faith and credit, or federal questions such as foreign sovereign im-
munity. See e.g., Compaq Computer Corp. v. LaPray, 135 S.W.3d 657 (Tex. 2004)
(legislative jurisdiction).
138. No. EP-07-CA-401-DB, 2008 WL 821576, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2008) (mem.).
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tors. In 2007, Spira intervened in a state court case in which Krafsur and
LeVert were parties, alleging that the two former directors had conspired
to breach their fiduciary duties to the corporation. Krafsur, a Colorado
resident, and LeVert, from Tennessee, demanded indemnification in the
state court action pursuant to Spira's corporate bylaws. 139 When Spira
refused, Krafsur and LeVert filed this diversity claim in federal court in
El Paso. Spira conceded diversity but contested subject matter jurisdic-
tion on amount-in-controversy grounds, arguing that plaintiffs' claims for
attorneys' fees could not be included in the calculation. The court re-
jected defendant's challenge, finding that the Texas Business Corporation
Act directed the application of the incorporating state's law.1 40 This di-
rected the court to Delaware law which permitted recovery of attorneys'
fees, thus satisfying the amount in controversy. 141
B. CHOICE-OF-LAW CLAUSES IN CONTRACTS
Texas law and the Restatement permit contracting parties to choose a
governing law,142 reflected in eight Survey-period cases. Validity is the
primary issue in choice of law clauses and Herkner v. Argo-Tech Corp.
Costa Mesa provides an instructive guide.1 43 The issue in Herkner was
plaintiff's entitlement to attorneys' fees after winning a jury trial on
wrongful denial of severance pay. The employment contract had a clause
designating Ohio law, which conflicted with Texas law by limiting con-
tractually based attorneys' fees to (1) those expressly included in the con-
tract, and (2) claims where the losing party had acted in bad faith.144
Plaintiff argued for Texas law, contending that Ohio lacked a sufficient
connection to the dispute. The company operated out of Ohio, but plain-
tiff was hired in Texas and then required to transfer to California. The
court relied on the pertinent Restatement section governing choice-of-
law clauses, which provides that the parties' choice applies unless it lacks
a substantial relation to claim or contravenes strong forum policy.1 4 5 The
court found in defendant's favor on both points, thus negating plaintiff's
attorneys' fees claim. 146
Breadth of coverage is another common issue with choice-of-law
clauses, that is, the coverage of claims that may be outside the contract's
boundaries. Three Survey period cases addressed this issue. Spectrum
139. Id. at *1.
140. Id. at *3 (citing TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT. ANN. art. 8.02 (Vernon 2003)).
141. Id. (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(e) (2009)).
142. See DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 677 (Tex. 1990). See also RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971).
143. No. H-06-2491, 2008 WL 2838115 (S.D. Tex. July 21, 2008) (mem.).
144. Id. at *2 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187).
145. Id.
146. Id. at *2.4 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 187 & 188).
See also Epcon Indus. Sys., L.P., v. Progressive Design, Inc., No. H-06-4123, 2007 WL
4591740 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 28, 2007) (mem.), which examined the parties' relation to Virginia
as a precondition of enforcing the Virginia choice-of-law clause in a dispute over the instal-
lation of an industrial incinerator in Virginia.
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Creations, L.P. v. Carolyn Kinder International, LLC involved disputes
resulting from a failed agreement for the manufacture of home lighting
for retail sale at Home Depot.147 The numerous claims included a range
of contract and tort-based claims between multiple plaintiffs and defend-
ants. The court held that the underlying contract's choice of Florida law
was sufficiently broad to cover all the claims,148 but had to turn to a Re-
statement analysis for opposing parties who lacked a contractual tie.
Under that analysis, Texas law governed. 149 The court in B.J. Tidwell In-
dustries, Inc. v. Diversified Home Products, Inc. similarly held that the
parties' choice of Texas law barred plaintiff's claim under the Tennessee
Consumer Protection Act, which plaintiff argued was a distinct tort claim
not covered by the clause. 150
The opinion in Orion Refining Corp. v. UOP raises the opposite end of
the spectrum.1 51 The case involved intellectual property and related
claims arising from a licensing agreement regarding oil refinery
processes. 152 On appeal from a summary judgment for defendant, the
court noted that the Illinois choice-of-law clause did not appear broad
enough to include the tort-based claims.153 But because the plaintiff/ap-
pellant had argued only under Illinois law, the court would decline a sua
sponte choice-of-law analysis.1 54
A possible conflict with federal law surfaced in Sky Technologies LLC
v. SAP AG, an intellectual property case concerning a party's standing to
litigate the assignment of patent rights.' 55 Various agreements in the case
designated both Massachusetts and Pennsylvania law, but the underlying
federal issues required the court to consider whether federal law pre-
empted state law. 156 It did not, and the court found that the plaintiff was
a proper assignee under Massachusetts law and had standing to bring the
claim. 157
Three other Survey period cases discussed below involved choice-of-
law clauses that were apparently too narrow to include non-contract
claims (or the parties failed to argue the clause's breadth), thus requiring
the court to conduct a Restatement analysis that sometimes led to multi-
ple states' laws governing the dispute.1 58
147. No. SA-05-CV-750-XR, 2008 WL 416264, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2008).
148. Id. at *18 (quoting the clause), *55.
149. Id. at *55-56.
150. No. SA-06-CA-264-FB, 2008 WL 559546, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 29, 2008).
151. 259 S.W.3d 749 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied).
152. Id. at 756.
153. Id. at 759 n.17.
154. Id.
155. No. 2:06-CV-440(DF), 2008 WL 5234644, at *5 (E.D. Tex. June 4, 2008).
156. Id. at *6.
157. Id. at *5-7.
158. See infra notes 193-99 and accompanying text.
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C. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIP TEST
In the absence of a statutory choice-of-law rule or an effective choice-
of-law clause, Texas courts apply the most significant relationship test
from the Restatement. 159
1. Commercial Cases
Sonat Exploration Co. v. Cudd Pressure Control, Inc. is a rehashing of a
claim that has been up and down in the Texas judicial system for a dec-
ade. 160 The case concerned insurance claims arising from a 1998 well ex-
plosion in Louisiana that killed seven people and severely injured
others.161 Well-owner Sonat Exploration had entered a Master Service
Agreement for snubbing operations with Cudd Pressure Control Inc. and
both were sued over the explosion.' 62 Sonat and Cudd had agreed to
indemnify each other, and, according to Sonat's interpretation, Lumber-
mens was required to provide insurance.' 63 Lumbermens was Cudd's ex-
cess insurer at the time. 164 When claimants sued Sonat and Cudd in
Texas, Sonat cross-claimed against Cudd for indemnity and separately
sued Cudd and Lumbermens for breach of contract. 65 Sonat and Cudd
jointly settled the wrongful death and injury claims, leaving only the in-
demnity claims against Cudd and Lumbermens.166 A potentially disposi-
tive issue was whether Louisiana or Texas law governed the Sonat/Cudd
agreement. 16 7 According to the parties' arguments, Louisiana law voided
the indemnity provision while Texas law upheld it.168 The trial court
ruled that Texas law applied, and in the resulting jury trial Sonat won a
$20.7 million verdict.169
Although Lumbermens was a party in related lawsuits, it was not a
party to this action which was then on appeal. Lumbermens nonetheless
posted a $29 million security bond for Cudd's appeal. When Cudd failed
to raise the all-important choice-of-law issue on appeal, Lumbermens in-
159. The embodiment of the most significant relationship test are seven factors to be
balanced according to the needs of the particular case. They are: (a) the needs of the
interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant policies of the forum, (c) the relevant
policies of other interested states, and the relative interests of those states in the determi-
nation of the particular issue, (d) the protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic
policies underlying the particular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of
result, and (g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2) (1971). This listing is not by priority,
which varies from case to case. Id. at § 6(2) cmt. c. In a larger sense, the most significant
relationship test includes the other choice of law sections throughout the Restatement.
160. 271 S.W.3d 228 (Tex. 2008).






167. Id. at 231.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 230.
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tervened.170 The court of appeals denied their intervention and Lumber-
mens brought a mandamus action in the Texas Supreme Court.171 In
what appeared to be a ruling of first impression-whether an indemnitor
may intervene on appeal to raise a dispositive issue-the supreme court
found in Lumbermens' favor and remanded to the court of appeals for
review of the choice-of-law decision. 172
On remand, the Texarkana Court of Appeals first found that the par-
ties' Master Service Agreement was intended to be used for well opera-
tion in several states, and though there was no choice-of-law designation
for any one state, the contract clearly indicated a wish that the law of the
state where the wells were located would govern a particular dispute. 173
The court of appeals then found this to be an inadequate contractual
choice of law and, in the absence of a clear choice by the parties, the
court performed a thorough most-significant-relationship analysis and
concluded that Louisiana law applied. 174
At that point in 2006, the case had been (1) tried to a jury verdict, (2)
appealed to the court of appeals on whether indemnitor Lumbermens
could intervene regarding choice of law (the ruling was against Lumber-
mens), (3) appealed to the Texas Supreme Court on the same interven-
tion issue (the ruling was for Lumbermens), and (4) remanded to the
court of appeals to conduct the choice-of-law analysis (choosing Louisi-
ana law). That 2006 court of appeals ruling then returned to the Texas
Supreme Court, which heard oral argument on February 6, 2008, and ren-
dered its opinion on November 21, 2008.175 The supreme court affirmed
the lower appellate court's choice of Louisiana law but disagreed with the
reasoning on grounds that elude analysis here. The court of appeals had
concluded that Louisiana law applied because it was the place of per-
formance and impliedly chosen by the parties. 176
The Texas Supreme Court rejected the conclusion that the Master Ser-
vice Agreement, contemplating multi-state performance, could have im-
pliedly chosen Louisiana law and instead found that the parties made no
choice of law for the jobs in Louisiana. 177 But, in a puzzling conclusion,
the court reasoned that, "Because contracts should be governed by the
law the parties had in mind when the contract was made, we hold in these
circumstances that Louisiana law applies." 178 The opinion does not ex-
170. See In re Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 184 S.W.3d 718 (Tex. 2006).
171. Id. at 722.
172. Id. at 722-29. The ruling was influenced by Louisiana lawsuits arising from the
same explosion, in which the Louisiana appellate court had not ruled on the choice-of-law
issue. See id. at 721 n.4.
173. See Cudd Pressure Control, Inc. v. Sonat Exploration Co., 202 S.W.3d 901, 903-05
(Tex. App.-Texarkana 2006), affd, 271 S.W.3d 228 (Tex. 2008).
174. Id. at 905-12.
175. Sonat Exploration Co. v. Cudd Pressure Control, Inc., 271 S.W.3d 228, 228 (Tex.
2008).
176. Id. at 232 (citing 202 S.W. 3d at 909-10).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 236.
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plain how implied choices of law differ from "the law the parties had in
mind." In reaching this conclusion, the court cited current sources as well
as older ones that significantly pre-date modern choice-of-law analysis.179
The vague difference from the court of appeals's reasoning does not un-
dermine a valid choice of Louisiana law. Having now reached the point
of determining what law applied to this 1998 explosion, the supreme
court remanded to the trial court for application of Louisiana law to the
indemnitee claims.180
GJP, Inc. v. Ghosh-discussed above in the personal jurisdiction sec-
tion-also provides what may be the Survey period's most instructive
choice-of-law analysis. 181 Briefly restated, the case concerned a Houston
buyer's online-initiated purchase of a red 1967 Jaguar E-type convertible
from a South Dakota seller.1 82 The defendant-sellers lost a jury trial and
appealed the application of Texas law along with other issues. The court
of appeals's thorough analysis included three preliminary steps often
overlooked by courts, though arguably superfluous in some cases. First,
the court noted that defendants properly requested South Dakota law
and offered more than adequate proof of its content. 183 Second, the
court observed that defendants properly preserved their objection when
the trial court applied Texas law. 184 Third, the court identified an actual
conflict between Texas and South Dakota law. 185 With the issue properly
framed, the court applied both the Restatement's most significant rela-
tionship test followed by the more specific fraud test.186 The court found
that while Texas and South Dakota were even on most factors, the fact
that plaintiff's reliance occurred in Texas was enough to tip the bal-
ance.' 87 The court also noted that Texas courts have tended to apply the
Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act to residents' claims against out of
state sellers.188
Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. RBP Chemical Technology, Inc. raises an
interesting issue of choice of law governing the court's subject matter ju-
179. Id. (citing DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 677 (Tex. 1990), which in
turn quoted Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 48 (1825)). The citation also refers to RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 cmt. b (1971).
180. Sonat Exploration, 271 S.W.3d at 237-38.
181. 251 S.W.3d 854 (Tex. App.-Austin 2008, no pet.); see supra notes 36-41 and ac-
companying text.
182. See GJP, Inc., 251 S.W.3d at 862-63.
183. Id. at 883.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 883-84.
186. Id. at 884.
187. Id. at 885 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6(2) & 148(2)
(1971) (fraud)). The court also noted that, "According to the Restatement, the place
where one party made and the other party received misrepresentations are of equal impor-
tance, but the place of reliance outweighs either factor in importance to the choice of law
inquiry." Id. at 885 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 148(2) cmt.
i).
188. Id. (citing Tracker Marine, L.P. v. Ogle, 108 S.W.3d 249 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.); Busse v. Pac. Cattle Feeding Fund # 1, Ltd., 896 S.W.2d 807, 814
(Tex. App.-Texarkana 1995, writ denied)).
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risdiction. 189 This federal case involves an insurer's declaratory judgment
action seeking to avoid defending a pollution case brought in'state court
in Texas. In the federal declaratory judgment case, plaintiff Cincinnati
Insurance Company also named the state court plaintiffs, who in turn
moved to dismiss the federal case because Texas law did not give them an
interest until judgment was rendered in the related case. This argument
was correct under Texas law but not under Wisconsin law.190 The court
first rejected the Texas statutory choice of law rule regarding insurance
interests in Texas, 19 1 and then ruled under Restatement section 6 that
Texas had too little connection and too little interest for Texas law to
apply, thus making Wisconsin law applicable. 192
Some contract-based cases involve choice-of-law clauses that may not
cover all the parties or all the claims, requiring an additional Restatement
analysis. Three Survey period cases illustrate the right approach. Super
Future Equities, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota, N.A.,-a case re-
flecting many headlines this past year-was a suit on the servicing of vari-
ous defaulted commercial mortgages. 193 Super Future was a borrower
claiming that defendants manufactured defaults, pursued unnecessary liti-
gation, falsified reports, and inflated values in order to sell loan securities,
and several other tortious activities. 194 The loan agreements had New
York choice-of-law clauses which the parties conceded as to the contract
claims. On the many tort claims, however, the Texas-based plaintiffs
urged that Texas law controlled. Applying the Restatement's basic tort
analysis, the court concluded that the more qualitative factors pointed to
Texas law.195
The court reached the same result in Highland Crusader Offshore Part-
ners, L.P. v. Lifecare Holdings, Inc., a case involving a fraud claim arising
from a financing agreement with a hospital group. 196 When refinancing
failed and the creditors sued, the parties conceded that the underlying
agreement's choice of New York law governed the contract issues, and
the court used a Restatement analysis to choose Texas law for the fraud
and other business tort claims.' 97
Malibu Consulting Corp. v. Funair Corp. involved parties from five
states-Texas, California, Florida, Oregon and Washington-but the
choices of law were limited to the first two.19 8 The claims arose from
plaintiff's purchase of a Boeing 727 from a Florida-based seller, with
189. No. 1:07-CV-699, 2008 WL 686156 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 6, 2008).
190. Id. at *2.
191. Id. at *3 (referring to TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 21.42 (Vernon Supp. 2008)).
192. Id. at *3-4.
193. No. 3:06-CV-0271-B, 2007 WL 4410370, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 14, 2007).
194. Id.
195. Id. at *10-11.
196. No. 3:08-CV-0102-B, 2008 WL 3925272 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 28, 2008).
197. Id. at *3 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145(2) (1971)
and based on "all or substantially all of the events giving rise to this litigation occurr[ing] in
Dallas County, Texas").
198. No. SA-06-CA-735-XR, 2008 WL 583882, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 28, 2008).
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claims also directed at the plane's Texas-based pre-sale inspector. No one
disputed the California choice-of-law clause in the underlying contract,
but plaintiff argued that its claims all sounded in tort. This argument was
moot when the court held that California law also governed tort
claims.199
In other Survey period cases, a Dallas federal court conducted what
appears to be a sua sponte choice-of-law analysis in a general contractor's
dispute with a subcontractor over the building of waterslides in a recrea-
tion park in Frisco, Texas, 20 0 and a Houston federal court held that Texas
law, where the contract originated, governed an employment dispute over




The Survey period included no significant choice-of-law opinions in-
volving non-commercial torts in a non-class-action setting, or at least no
new analyses. Two cases are nonetheless worth reporting-one because
it raises an earlier issue that has gathered national attention, and the sec-
ond because it illustrates a too-sparse opinion.
The question garnering national attention is what law governs the vica-
rious or direct liability of car rental companies whose customer negli-
gently kills or injures someone in another state.20 2 The opinion in Cates
v. Creamer also shows the careful procedural steps that must be observed
in drawn-out litigation.20 3
Matthew Creamer rented a car in Florida from Hertz.20 4 Creamer fell
asleep while driving through Texas, severely injuring Texas resident
Bobby Cates, who later died.20 5 Cates filed a federal diversity claim
against both Creamer and Hertz in a federal court in the Northern Dis-
trict of Texas. 20 6 The trial court held that Texas law governed all claims
and granted summary judgment to Hertz, finding that it was not vicari-
ously liable under Texas law.20 7 At the first trial, the jury found for de-
fendant Creamer. The trial court granted a second trial which held
Creamer 70% at fault. 20 8
199. Id. at *2-4 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6 & 145).
200. See Robax Corp. v. Prof. Parks, Inc., No. 3:07-CV-1399-D, 2008 WL 3244150 (N.D.
Tex. Aug. 8, 2008). Plaintiff was a Texas corporation and the subcontractor-defendant was
from Tennessee. The pertinent facts occurred in both places, but the court chose Texas law
as the place of performance. Id., at *9-10 (applying RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS §§ 6 & 188). The court also cited precedent for the point that place of perform-
ance is the most important factor in choosing the law for contract disputes. Id., at *10.
201. See Talent Tree, Inc. v. Madlock, No. 4:07-CV-03735, 2008 WL 4104163, at *3 (S.D.
Tex. Sept. 2, 2008) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6 & 188).
202. See Symeonides, supra note 82.
203. No. 7:00-CV-0121-O ECF, 2008 WL 2620097 (N.D. Tex. June 27, 2008).
204. Id. at *1.
205. Id. at *1-2.
206. Id. at *1.
207. Id.
208. Id. at *1-2.
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The parties appealed several issues, including Hertz's dismissal. The
Fifth Circuit upheld the jury verdict against Creamer but reversed Hertz's
summary judgment dismissal, finding that Florida law governed Hertz's
vicarious liability.20 9 The appellate court further directed that on re-
mand, the trial court was to consider whether Florida's dangerous instru-
mentality doctrine applied to nonresidents of Florida, noting that this was
a question of first impression under Florida law and instructing the trial
court to conduct an "Erie guess" on Florida's likely position.210 Based on
the Fifth Circuit's ruling, the plaintiff moved for entry of judgment
against Hertz, arguing that Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine
did apply to Creamer's accident in Texas, thus rendering Hertz vicari-
ously liable for Cates's death.211 In a crucial misstep, Hertz filed an op-
posing motion limited to arguing that Florida law did not apply. What
Hertz failed to do was ask for a re-assessment of damages in light of
Bobby Cates's death after the original jury trial. On February 25, 2008,
the trial court issued its opinion that Florida law did apply to Cates's
claim.212 Hertz then moved for new trial, which the court denied on the
grounds that it had not been timely raised and it was time to put an end
to the litigation. 213
In Flores v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., the court was faced with a wrongful
death claim and survivors' claims arising from Maria Holstine's death
when her idling minivan slipped out of park and struck the decedent who
was unloading a sewing machine. 214 Michigan-based DaimlerChrysler
made the improbable argument that Michigan law, which did not recog-
nize punitive damages, should apply to negate plaintiffs' punitive dam-
ages claim. The court reached a no-doubt appropriate conclusion that
Texas law applied but did so with sparse analysis. 215 It first noted that
Texas follows the most significant relationship test and then erroneously
quoted the secondary test for personal injury rather than the primary
seven-factor balancing test found in Restatement section 6.216 The Texas
Supreme Court, on the other hand, has expressly adopted section 6's
seven-factor test, but has not officially adopted the entire Restatement. 217
Those other sections are nonetheless persuasive and worth consulting,
but the official law in Texas is primarily section 6 and all choice-of-law
arguments not controlled by statute or contract should apply that test.
209. Id.
210. Cates v. Creamer, 431 F.3d 456, 466 (5th Cir. 2005) (discussed at James P. George
& Anna Teller, Conflict of Laws, 59 SMU L. REV. 1039, 1067 (2006)).
211. Id.
212. Cates v. Creamer, No. 7:00-CV-0121-R, 2008 WL 495710 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2008).
213. Cates, 2008 WL 2620097, at *1-2.
214. No. L-06-CV-53, 2008 WL 822008, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2008) (mem.).
215. Id. at *4.
216. Id.
217. See Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 420-21 (Tex. 1984).
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3. Class Action Certifications
Class actions certified under the common-question-predominates stan-
dard of Texas and federal law require a showing that a common question
of law or fact predominates over disparate issues in the case.21 8 In
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Inman, the Texas Supreme Court reaffirmed its
prior mandate that trial courts must not postpone choice-of-law analysis
until after certification because the courts cannot evaluate the predomi-
nance or individual claims and defenses issues without first knowing what
law is applicable to those determinations. 219 The defendant argued that
the trial court erred in certifying the class before selecting the governing
law regarding defective seat belt buckle design. 22 0 According to defen-
dant, a proper choice-of-law analysis required the court to apply the laws
of forty-eight states and adjudicate issues peculiar to individual class
members, thus precluding certification.22 1
The supreme court held that the lower court abused its discretion in
certifying the class. 222 In the context of a nationwide class action, the
determination of the applicable substantive law is of paramount impor-
tance. Following its holding in Lapray, which mandated a detailed choice-
of-law analysis in multi-state class actions, the supreme court held that
this issue was settled and that when reviewing a class certification, appel-
late courts must evaluate "the claims, defenses, relevant facts, and appli-
cable substantive law."'223 To evaluate the applicable substantive law, the
trial courts must "abandon the practice of postponing choice-of-law ques-
tions until after certification," concluding that appellate courts cannot
evaluate the predominance and individual claims and defenses without
knowing what law is applicable.22
4
In a similar case, Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Patterson,
the court of appeals criticized the trial court's failure to conduct a choice-
of-law analysis of the proposed multi-state class prior to certification.
225
In that case, a chiropractor filed a class action suit against five insurance
companies for providing an "Explanation of Reimbursement" form letter
to his patients informing them of the physician reimbursement amount.
The physician claimed that the letter was defamatory because it asserted
that physicians committed malpractice and malfeasance and were incom-
218. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3); TEX. R. Civ. P. 42(b)(3); see also Compaq Computer
Corp. v. Lapray, 135 S.W.3d 657, 672 (Tex. 2004), in which the Texas Supreme Court clari-
fied the need for an appropriate choice-of-law analysis in certifying multi-state class ac-
tions. Lapray is discussed at James P. George & Anna Teller, Conflict of Laws, 58 SMU L.
REV. 679, 706-07 (2005).
219. 252 S.W.3d 299, 316 (Tex. 2008).
220. Id. at 301-03.
221. Id. at 303.
222. Id. at 307-08.
223. Id. at 316 (citing Sw. Ref. Co. v. Bernal, 225 S.W.3d 425, 435 (Tex. 2002)) (Jeffer-
son, C.J., dissenting).
224. Id. at 316-17 (quoting Compaq Comp. Corp. v Lapray, 135 S.W.3d 657, 672 (Tex.
2004)).
225. Nos. 13-06-258-CV, 13-13-06-259-CV, 2007 WL 4225504, at *8 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi Nov. 29 2007, no pet.).
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petent and dishonest. Further, he claimed the "letters induced the pa-
tient/recipient to breach [the] relationship with [the physician] and refrain
from paying [the balance on the treatments already] received. '226 On the
patients' behalf, he claimed that the insurer's practice of disclosing confi-
dential patient information in the letters was unlawful and sought certifi-
cation of a libel and tortious interference "physician class," and a breach
of duty of confidentiality class on behalf of his patients.2 27 The trial court
certified both classes.
The defendants argued that the trial court failed to conduct a proper
choice-of-law analysis prior to certification of the "physician class" and
that this failure defeated the predominance requirement for class ac-
tions. 228 There was nothing in the trial court's order to suggest that the
trial court conducted a choice-of-law analysis. Following the Texas Su-
preme Court's holding in Compaq Computer Corp. v. Lapray, the appel-
late court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion when it
certified a class without first conducting an extensive choice-of-law analy-
sis to determine if any differences in the state law of the parties would
affect predominance in a Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 42 (b)(3) class
action.22 9 The appellate court reversed the certification of the "physician
class" and remanded it to the trial court for further proceedings.2 30
4. Corporate Governance
Choice of law rules generally determine which state's or country's laws
will govern the claims raised by the parties. In Davaco, Inc. v. AZ3, Inc.,
a Dallas federal court applied a choice-of-law rule to a personal jurisdic-
tion question. 231 Arguing alter ego, plaintiffs sued a subsidiary and its
parent corporation, both based in Quebec, for the subsidiary's alleged
misdeeds in Texas. The court noted that corporate alter ego is governed
by the law of the state of incorporation and that under Quebec law the
parent was not the subsidiary's alter ego. 2 3 2
D. OTHER CHOICE-OF-LAw ISSUES
1. False Conflicts
"A false conflict exists either when other potentially-applicable laws
are the same as the [forum laws], or when the laws reach the same re-
226. Id. at *1.
227. Id.
228. Id. at *7 (citing TEx. R. Civ. P. 42(b)(3)).
229. Id. at *8 (citing Lapray, 135 S.W.3d at 672).
230. Id. at *10; see also Karnes v. Fleming, No. H-07-0620, 2008 WL 4528223, at *6-7
(S.D. Tex. July 31, 2008) (mem.) (finding that the potential class members' claims against
their former attorneys occurred in all fifty states with various legal standards, thus defeat-
ing the commonality requirement).
231. No. 3:07-CV-803, 2008 WL 2243382 (N.D. Tex. May 30, 2008) (mem.).
232. Id. at *1-2.
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sult. '2 33 Defining a clear, outcome-changing difference between the fo-
rum and the foreign law is the first step in conducting a choice-of-law
analysis, and the absence of a clear conflict should result in the applica-
tion of forum law. 234 The fact that the laws do not conflict may compel a
conclusion that the cases are not worth reporting, but that is a hasty con-
clusion in some cases. Why the court determined the conflict to be false,
the setting in which the laws appeared identical, or the necessary degree
of similarity, are all issues that may prove valuable to readers contemplat-
ing a choice-of-law argument. Moreover, while some false-conflicts anal-
yses may be cursory, some are complex. 235 Teel v. Hospital Partners of
America, Inc. is a former employee's attempt to collect a severance pack-
age against an employer who argued that Teel waived it by violating the
non-compete clause. 236 Both parties moved for summary judgment
under Texas law on a contract that expressly invoked North Carolina law.
Citing the need for an abundance of caution, the court analyzed the
claims under both and found the contract enforceable under both.237
2. D~pegage
D~pezage is the practice of splitting multiple claims in a lawsuit, or mul-
tiple issues in a claim, and applying different states' laws to the separate
issues or claims. Dpegage is controlled by forum law and is largely
within the court's discretion. Texas law requires ddpegage, that is, choice
of law on an issue-by-issue basis. 238 In Coachmen Industries, Inc. v. Willis
of Illinois, Inc. the court-without offering its analysis-stated that Illi-
nois law governed the contract claims while Texas law governed the negli-
gence claims.2 3 9 In its application of Illinois law, the court further noted
that it was assumed to be identical to Texas law except where otherwise
noted.2 40 Arkoma Basin Exploration Co. v. FMF Associates 1990-A, Ltd.,
discussed below, involved a less-common instance of dipe(age in the use
of another state's procedural rules.24 1
233. This is the Restatement's definition of false conflict. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 cmt. I (1971); id. § 186 cmt. c. A very different concept of
false conflicts came from Professor Brainerd Currie's government interest analysis, which
defines a false conflict as one in which only one state has a real interest. See SCOLES ET AL.,
supra note 2 at 29-30. Unfortunately, Texas courts have used both definitions. See gener-
ally James P. George, False Conflicts and Faulty Analysis: Judicial Misuse of Governmental
Interests in the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws, 23 REV. LITIG. 489 (2004).
234. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 823-45 (1985) (Stevens, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
235. In the 2004 Survey period, a case involving arguments for the application of five
states' laws ended up with a false conflict. George & Teller, supra note 210, at 1069 (citing
In re Senior Living Prop. LLC Trust, 309 B.R. 223, 228 (N.D. Tex. 2004)).
236. No. H-06-3991, 2008 WL 346377, at *4-7 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2008) (mem.).
237. Id. at *4-7.
238. See Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 421 (Tex. 1984).
239. 565 F. Supp. 2d 755, 758 n.3 (S.D. Tex. 2008).
240. Id.
241. See 249 S.W.3d 380 (Tex. 2008); see also infia notes 255-59 and accompanying text.
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3. Notice and Proof of Foreign Law
Litigants seeking the application of another state's or nation's law must
comply with the forum's rules for pleading and proving foreign law. In
both Texas and federal courts, judicial notice is sufficient for the applica-
tion of sister-states' laws. 242 Foreign country law, on the other hand,
must be adequately pleaded and proven.2 43 Three opinions from the Sur-
vey period underscored the need to plead and prove foreign law and the
presumption that unproven law was the same as Texas law.
The Texas Supreme Court's split ruling in Excess Underwriters at
Lloyd's London v. Frank's Casing Crew & Rental Tools, Inc. is one of
2008's more controversial opinions.244 The case arose from the collapse
of a drilling platform in the Gulf of Mexico. Frank's Casing manufac-
tured the platform for ARCO/Vastar, which brought claims against
Frank's Casing, which had a $1 million primary liability policy and $10
million excess liability coverage with Excess Underwriters at Lloyd's,
London. 245
The primary ruling concerned the excess insurer's right to reimburse-
ment from the insured for settling uninsured claims, an issue won by the
insured with strong dissents from three justices.2 46 The history and analy-
sis of the long-litigated case is beyond this article's scope, but the choice-
of-law issues bear brief mention. On appeal, Excess Underwriters argued
that Louisiana law controlled the underlying issue-their right to reim-
bursement. The supreme court rejected this argument because Excess
Underwriters failed to raise choice of law at the trial stage and instead
merely alluded to Louisiana law in a footnote to its summary judgment
motion. The court additionally found that Excess Underwriter's citations
242. Texas Rule of Evidence 202 allows a Texas court to take judicial notice of sister
states' laws on its own motion and requires it to do so upon a party's motion. Parties must
supply "sufficient information" for the court to comply. Id. Federal practice is the same
under federal common law; neither the Federal Rules of Evidence nor the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure address judicial notice of American states' laws. See Lamar v. Micou, 114
U.S. 218, 223 (1885); Kucel v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 813 F.2d 67, 74 (5th Cir. 1987). Even
though Federal Rule of Evidence 201 (the sole federal evidence rule dealing with judicial
notice) does not apply to states' laws, we should assume that Lamar's judicial notice man-
date for American states' laws is subject to Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b)'s provision for
proof of matters "capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." FED. R. EvID. 201(b). That is, federal courts
may take judicial notice of American states' laws from (1) official statutory and case re-
ports, (2) widely-used unofficial versions, or (3) copies, all subject to evidentiary rules on
authentication and best evidence.
243. Texas Rule of Evidence 203 requires written notice of foreign law by pleading or
other reasonable notice at least thirty days before trial, including all written materials or
sources offered as proof. For non-English originals, parties must provide copies of both
the original and the English translation. TEX. R. EvID. 203. Sources include affidavits,
testimony, briefs, treatises, and any other material source, whether or not submitted by a
party, and whether or not otherwise admissible under the Texas Rules of Evidence. Id.
Federal practice is similar. See FED. R. Civ. P. 44.1.
244. See generally 246 S.W.3d 42 (2008).
245. Id. at 44-45.
246. Id. at 45-54 (majority); id. at 54-69 (Hecht, J., dissenting, joined by Green, J.); id. at
69-76 (Wainright, J., dissenting).
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to Louisiana law did not establish a clear conflict with Texas law.24 7
In Coachmen Industries, Inc. v. Alternative Service Concepts L.L.C.
plaintiff Coachmen sought leave to amend late in the case to add claims
under other states' laws.248 Coachman's suit alleged that two defendants,
one with its principal place of business in Tennessee and the other with its
principal place of business in Illinois, had breached various duties to
Coachman in handling a personal injury claim in Texas. Coachman ini-
tially alleged claims under Texas law, but late in the case, defendants filed
summary judgment motions arguing that Texas insurance law did not ap-
ply.249 Coachman sought to amend its complaint to allege claims under
Tennessee and Illinois law alleging that it discovered new information
which involved choice-of-law issues, and that the "[d]efendants [bore] the
burden of timely pleading choice-of-law as an affirmative defense. 250
The court found that since Coachman filed suit against corporations
that it knew were located in Illinois and Tennessee, it "was on notice that
choice-of-law issues may be relevant to th[e] suit" early in the case.251
Thus, the possible applicability of Illinois or Tennessee law could not be a
newly-discovered issue.252 Second, the court rejected the argument that
choice of law was an affirmative defense because "[u]nder federal plead-
ing requirements, [a defendant] need not plead the applicability of [an-
other state's] law to preserve a choice-of-law question. '2 53
In Floyd v. Hefner, the court observed that although Texas choice-of-
law principles pointed to the application of Cayman Islands law (the
place of incorporation), the court would assume that Texas law applies
because no party had offered any proof of foreign law.254
4. Choice of Procedural Law
Two Survey period cases demonstrated the unusual development of ap-
plying another state's procedural law. In Arkoma Basin Exploration Co.
v. FMF Associates 1990-A, Ltd., eight Virginia limited partnerships sued
Arkoma Basin Exploration Company for fraud regarding its estimates of
mineral reserves in southeastern Oklahoma.255 The trial court instructed
the jury to apply Virginia law, including its heightened burden of proof
requiring clear and convincing evidence of fraud. 256 The court of appeals
affirmed in part but set aside the remittur.257 The Texas Supreme Court
also affirmed in part, finding in favor of two plaintiffs and rejecting the
other claims. The supreme court agreed that Virginia's heightened stan-
247. Id. at 52-53.
248. No. H-06-0892, 2008 WL 177715, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 2008) (mem.).
249. Id.
250. Id. at *2.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. (quoting Kucel v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 813 F.2d 67, 74 (5th Cir. 1987)).
254. 556 F. Supp. 2d 617, 633 n.11 (S.D. Tex. 2008).
255. 249 S.W.3d 380, 383 (Tex. 2008).
256. Id.
257. Id. (omitting internal citation).
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dard applied not only at trial but also as the standard of review for
fraud, 258 but rejected Arkoma's argument that Virginia law governed the
sufficiency-of-evidence review for damages.25 9
A second opinion, In re Crown Castle International Corp., went even
further in applying another state's procedural law when it ruled that Del-
aware law governed the pleading requirements in a shareholders' deriva-
tive suit.260 The argument was not directed to dismissal but to the
pleading level-a heightened standard in Delaware-required as the
threshold for discovery. 26 1
5. Statutes of Limitations
Choice of law regarding limitations periods raised two of the more in-
teresting points in two opinions during the Survey period-one an appel-
late opinion with a sharp dissent, and the other summarily decided in a
federal trial court. Satterfield v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc. addressed
the issue of the retroactive effect of a barring limitation statute enacted
after the plaintiff won a partial summary judgment on liability.262 Jerrold
Braley was a retired pipefitter who filed a mesothelioma action in Travis
County in 2002. Defendants were a number of asbestos-related compa-
nies and successor entities, including Crown, which had acquired Mundet
Cork Corporation, one of the asbestos sources. Braley died in the next
few months and Satterfield substituted as plaintiff.263
In the pre-trial stage, Crown conceded that Texas had no interest in
having its substantive law applied, and "only Pennsylvania has any inter-
est in the outcome of this case."'2 64 Based on this, the trial court granted
a partial summary judgment against Crown, imposing successor liability
258. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 133 (1971) (providing
that "The forum will apply its own local law in determining which party has the burden of
persuading the trier of fact on a particular issue unless the primary purpose of the relevant
rule of the state of the otherwise applicable law is to affect decision of the issue rather than
to regulate the conduct of the trial. In that event, the rule of the state of the otherwise
applicable law will be applied.")).
259. Id. at 387 (citing various sources including RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 122 (providing that "A court usually applies its own local laws prescribing how
litigation shall be conducted even when it applies the local law rules of another state to
resolve other issues in the case.")).
260. 247 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. granted).
261. Id. at 352-55.
262. 268 S.W.3d 190 (Tex. App.-Austin 2008, no pet.).
263. Id. at 199.
264. Id. at 196-97 n.4. Rather than Pennsylvania law, the trial court initially applied the
most significant relationship test to hold that New York law (where both Mundet and
Crown were incorporated) governed successor liability. Id. at 226-27 (Law, C.J., dissent-
ing); see also id. at 223 n.7 (Law, C.J., dissenting) (citing Torrington Co. v. Stutzman, 26
S.W.3d 829, 848 (Tex. 2001); Hughes Wood Prods., Inc. v. Wagner, 18 S.W.3d 202, 204 (Tex.
2000); and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6, 145 (1971). The majority
side-stepped any definitive choice-of-law issue, holding instead that the retroactive limita-
tions period-discussed below-abrogated rights not only under other states' possibly ap-




for Braley's exposure to Mundet's asbestos products. 265 Four days later,
the Texas legislature enacted the comprehensive tort-reform law known
as House Bill 4.266 Pertinent to this case, House Bill 4 imposed a statu-
tory choice of Texas limitations law on asbestos claims based on successor
liability.267 The new law went beyond limitations issues to abrogate the
application of other states' laws that might apply under Texas choice-of-
law rules, 268 and, most pertinent to the instant case, made the law effec-
tive immediately to pending cases. 269 Responding to the newly-enacted
law, the trial court granted summary judgment for Crown.
The court of appeals reversed under the Texas Constitution's ban on
retroactive laws.270 The court deemed the ban to apply to laws negating
or impacting vested rights, which existed here based not on the summary
judgment, which of course was not final, but on the fact of the claim being
accrued and filed in court. 27 1 A strong dissent argued that the Texas leg-
islature had the power to alter common law choice-of-law rules and that
it clearly did so in the pertinent portions of House Bill 4.272
In Klein v. O'Neal the court summarily rejected plaintiffs' argument
that the limitation period in a wrongful death class action could be gov-
erned by anything other than forum law, relying on the United States
Supreme Court's ruling in Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman.273 In doing so, the
court may have read more into Wortman than the court intended. Wort-
man determines whether the constitution permits a state to impose its
own limitation period on a case arising elsewhere, but Wortman does not
resolve the question here-whether Texas choice-of-law rules would ap-
ply a foreign limitation period. Texas precedents point in both direc-
tions,274 and the Texas Supreme Court has thus far dodged any definitive
ruling on this. Specifically, the Texas Supreme Court declined adoption of
the Restatement's limitations rule, although this decision appears to be
based on the advocating party's failure to support its argument rather
265. Satterfield, 268 S.W.3d at 197.
266. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 26 (Vernon 2008).
267. See TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 149.001-.006 (Vernon 2005).
268. Satterfield, 268 S.W.3d at 223 (citing TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 149.006).
269. Id. (citing TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 149.001).
270. See id. at 200-14 (citing TEX. CONST. art. I, §§ 16, 29, the open courts provision of
TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13, and numerous case citations).
271. Id. at 206-14.
272. Id. at 236 (Law, C.J., dissenting). The dissent further invoked the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 5 (1971) which provides that "choice-of-law rules are as
open to reexamination as any other common-law rules." Id. at 226 (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 5).
273. No. 7:03-CV-102-D, 2008 WL 2152030, at *2 n.2 (N.D. Tex. May 22, 2008) (mem.)
(citing Sun Oil v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 722, 727-28 (1988)).
274. See Intevep, S.A. Research & Tech. Support Establishment v. Sena, 41 S.W.3d 391,
394 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001, no pet.) (applying a Venezuelan one-year limitation period
(as opposed to the four-year Texas-period) to an employment case under the theory that
limitations issues are procedural except when the statute creating the right of action incor-
porates an express limitation). See generally Hill v. Perel, 923 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ); Rush v. Barrios, 56 S.W.3d 88 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied).
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than the court's rejection of the Restatement rule.275 If Texas were to
adopt the Restatement position, it would support the court's application
of the Texas limitation period in Klein.276
6. Federal Choice-of-Law Rules
Although state law controls choice of law in most cases in state and
federal courts, federal law has both statutory277 and common law.278
Three cases during the Survey period illustrate the pertinence of both
statutory and common law to maritime choice-of-law analyses. In Guil-
lotte v. Energy Partners, Ltd., the court applied the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act to choose Louisiana law over general maritime law (that
is, federal common law) to govern a personal injury claim,279 with a simi-
lar analysis in Baudoin v. Houston Exploration Co., also choosing Louisi-
ana law while pointing out the strong policy that federal common law not
override applicable state law even in offshore cases.280 In Najera v. M/V
Clipper Lis, a Houston federal court used the common law balancing test
in Lauritzen v. Larsen to reject the application of Bahamian law, favoring
instead American maritime law for a personal injury claim. 28'
Some federal choice-of-law rules have mixed origins, flowing from judi-
cial construction of federal statutes. One example is inconvenient forum
275. See Monsanto Co. v. Boustany, 73 S.W.3d 225, 233 (Tex. 2002). Monsanto in-
volved an action by 110 former Monsanto employees suing for the right to exercise stock
options that were originally promised for a fixed period, then extended as part of a sever-
ance package. For the contract claims, the Texas Supreme Court honored the parties' con-
tractual choice of law, finding a reasonable relation to the agreement and no violation of
Texas public policy. Monsanto won this claim but lost on the second choice of law issue
regarding claims for fraud and conversion. The issue was limitations and Monsanto urged
the court to adopt RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 142 (1971), which it
believed pointed to Delaware's three year period (rather than four years in Texas). But
Monsanto's brief failed to argue the substance or effect of the Delaware limitation period,
and the court accordingly declined to consider it and remanded for litigation of the fraud
and conversion claims.
276. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 142, which provides that:
"Whether a claim will be maintained against the defense of the statute of limitations is
determined under the principles stated in § 6. In general, unless the exceptional circum-
stances of the case make such a result unreasonable: (1) The forum will apply its own
statute of limitations barring the claim; (2) The forum will apply its own statute of limita-
tions permitting the claim unless: (a) maintenance of the claim would serve no substantial
interest of the forum; and (b) the claim would be barred under the statute of limitations of
a state having a more significant relationship to the parties and the occurrence."
277. See e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 85 (2006) (providing for choice of law for rates of interest
charged by federally regulated banking associations); 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2000) (provid-
ing for choice of law in claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act).
278. See generally Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
279. No. G-06-0671, 2008 WL 828052, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2008) (mem.) (citing the
choice-of-law provisions in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356
(2000)).
280. Id.
281. Id. (listing a number of factors for determining maritime choice of law including
(1) the wrongful act's situs, (2) the law of the ship's flag, (3) the injured party's domicile,
(4) the shipowner's allegiance or domicile, (5) the contract's situs, (6) any foreign forum's
accessibility, (7) the law of the forum, and (8) the shipowner's base of operations); see also
Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306, 309 (1907); Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 583-90.
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transfers within the federal system, with case law holding that in diversity
cases the law of the transferor court governs choice of law. In Eisentstadt
v. Telephone Electronics Corp., a Dallas federal court applied this rule to
a trio of cases, one filed originally in Dallas and the other two originally
filed in federal courts in Mississippi and California. 282 After inconvenient
forum transfers to the Northern District of Texas, the Dallas federal court
found that the three states' choice-of-law rules differed enough to require
separate choice-of-law analyses. After a careful and well-done assess-
ment under the three states' choice-of-law approaches to various claims,
the court concluded that (1) Texas law governed the claims for tortious
interference with business opportunities; (2) Mississippi law governed
tortious interference with contract; (3) California law governed claims for
fraud and aiding and abetting; and (4) Texas law governed punitive
damages.28 3
During the Survey period, two federal opinions applied what appear to
be federal common law choice-of-law rules to the issue of piercing the
corporate veil. The Davaco opinion, discussed above, rejected an alter-
ego argument regarding personal jurisdiction over a Canadian corporate
subsidiary.284 In doing so, it announced that the law of the state of incor-
poration governs veil piercing. 285 This makes sense and is in fact consis-
tent with the Restatement, but the court's only cited authorities were five
other federal opinions with no reference to Texas law as providing the
choice-of-law rule.
In Ace American Insurance Co. v. Huntsman Corp.. the court consid-
ered whether to bind a non-signatory corporate subsidiary to an arbitra-
tion clause.286 Veil-piercing was an issue as well, and the court applied
the same apparently-federal rule that the incorporating state's law gov-
erns veil-piercing in federal court.287
It may seem odd to suggest that federal courts are violating state inter-
ests by applying the incorporating state's law to an issue. But the Su-
preme Court has clearly stated more than once that in the absence of
federal law, federal courts must use the local state's choice-of-law rule to
select which state or foreign law governs the non-federal issue.288 One of
the Davaco opinion's federal citations made that point, that is, that the
North Carolina choice-of-law rule was appropriate. 289 On the other
282. No. 3:06-CV-1196-O, 2008 WL 4386993 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2008) (mem.).
283. Id. at *12. For additional adjudication in the same case, see generally Eisentstadt v.
Tel. Elecs. Corp., No. 3:06-CV-1196-0, 2008 WL 4452999 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2008).
284. Davaco, Inc. v. AZ3, Inc., No. 3:07-CV-803, 2008 WL 2243382, at *2 (N.D. Tex.
May 30, 2008) (mem.); see also discussion supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
285. Id. at *1.
286. 255 F.R.D. 179 (S.D. Tex. 2008).
287. Id. at 195.
288. See, e.g., Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496-97 (1941); Day &
Zimmerman, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3, 4-5 (1975).
289. See Davaco, 2008 WL 2243382, at *1 (citing Dassault Falcon Jet Corp. v. Oberflex,
Inc., 909 F. Supp. 345, 348 (M.D.N.C. 1995)). In Dassault, the question of what law gov-
erned piercing the veil was one of first impression; the federal district court used persua-
20091 1053
SMU LAW REVIEW
hand, there is an exception that may justify these two Texas federal opin-
ions. Where federal law is silent, state law nonetheless may not apply if
the issue is one of compelling federal interest. Those interests include
such things as claims by and against the United States and interstate and
international relations.290 Whether issues such as personal jurisdiction or
compelling arbitration present a compelling federal interest will require
further analysis that exceeds this article's scope. In any event, the two
Texas federal opinions on which state's law governs veil piercing are no
doubt correct in their result. The question is whether a Texas choice-of-
law rule, or an Erie guess as to that rule, needed to be part of the loop.
1II. FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
Foreign judgments from other states and countries create Texas con-
flict-of-laws issues in two ways: (1) their local enforcement, and (2) their
preclusive effect on local lawsuits. Foreign judgments include those from
sister states and foreign country judgments, but do not include federal
court judgments from districts outside Texas because those judgments are
enforced as local federal court judgments. 291
Texas recognizes two methods of enforcing foreign judgments:
the common law method using the foreign judgment as the basis for
a local lawsuit 292 and, since 1981, the more direct procedure under
two uniform judgments acts,293 along with similar acts for arbitration
sive authority from the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 cmt. b
(1971). See Dassault, 909 F. Supp. at 348-49.
290. See, e.g., Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981) (discussed
in CHARLES A. WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 413-420 (6th ed.
2002)).
291. See 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (2000).
292. The underlying mandate for the common law enforcement is the full faith and
credit clause of the United States Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, and its statutory
counterpart, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000). The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
Act (UEFJA) specifically reserves the common law method as an alternative. See TEX.
CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 35.008 (Vernon 2008).
293. Sister-state judgments are enforced under the UEFJA, id. §§ 35.001-.007. The Act
requires (1) the judgment creditor to file a copy of the judgment authenticated under fed-
eral or Texas law; (2) notice to the judgment debtor from the clerk, or the judgment credi-
tor. The judgment debtor may (1) move to stay enforcement if grounds exist under the law
of Texas or the rendering state, id § 35.006, and (2) challenge enforcement along traditional
full faith and credit grounds such as the rendering state's lack of personal or subject matter
jurisdiction. Id. §§ 35.003-.006. Foreign-country judgments for money are enforced under
the Uniform Foreign Country Money-Judgment Recognition Act (UFCMJRA), id.
§§ 36.001-.008. Like the UEFJA, the UFCMJRA requires the judgment creditor to file a
copy of the foreign country judgment that has been authenticated under federal or Texas
law, with notice to the debtor provided either by the clerk, or the creditor. Id. §§ 36.0041-
.0043. The judgment debtor has thirty days to challenge enforcement, or sixty if domiciled
in a foreign country, with a twenty-day extension available for good cause. Id. § 36.0044.
Unlike the UEFJA, the UFCMJRA explicitly states ten grounds for non-recognition-
three mandatory and seven discretionary. Briefly stated, the mandatory grounds are (1)
lack of an impartial tribunal, (2) lack of personal jurisdiction, and (3) lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Id. § 36.005(a). The discretionary grounds for non-recognition are that the
foreign action (1) involved inadequate notice, (2) was obtained by fraud, (3) violates Texas
public policy, (4) is contrary to another final judgment, (5) is contrary to the parties' agree-
ment (e.g., a contrary forum selection clause), (6) was in an inconvenient forum, and (7) is
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awards, 294 child custody,295 and child support.2 96 This conflicts article will
defer to the other topics in the Annual Survey for coverage of interstate
and international child custody and child support issues.
The Survey period included three noteworthy foreign-judgment cases
raising issues of death penalty sanctions from a New York court, the dura-
tion of the Texas court's jurisdiction to enforce judgments, and proper
venue. All three cases involved sister-state judgments under the Uniform
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (UEFJA).
In Enviropower, L.L.C. v. Bear, Sterns & Co., the issue was whether a
judgment resulting from a "death penalty" discovery sanction was en-
forceable under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.2 97 Bear, Sterns sued
Enviropower in New York state court for breach of contract and quantum
merit. The New York court found that EnviroPower had intentionally
withheld discovery documents and struck its answer as a sanction. The
Court thereafter entered a judgment for Bear, Sterns, who sought to do-
mesticate it in a Harris County court.2 98 EnviroPower moved to vacate
the judgment, arguing that because the foreign judgment was based on a
"death penalty" sanction, which is penal in nature, the judgment was not
enforceable under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.2 99 In a case of first
impression, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision, finding
that death penalty sanctions for discovery abuse were not excepted from
enforcement under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Relying on United
States Supreme Court precedent, the court of appeals held that only
criminal or quasi-criminal statutes are the types of penal statutes that fall
under the exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause.300
In BancorpSouth Bank v. Prevot the court of appeals held that a Texas
court has jurisdiction to enforce a foreign judgment pursuant to the
UEFJA even after the trial court's general plenary power expires. 30 1 In
not from a country granting reciprocal enforcement rights. Id. § 36.005(b). The UFCM-
JRA also provides for stays, and expressly reserves the right of enforcement of non-money
judgments under traditional, non-statutory standards. Id. §§ 36.007-.008; see also Hilton v.
Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895) (comity as discretionary grounds for recognizing and enforcing
foreign country judgments).
294. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2006 & Supp. 2008); Texas Interna-
tional Arbitration Act, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 172.082(f) (Vernon 2005).
295. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 152.001-.317 (Vernon 2008).
296. Id. §§ 159.001-.902.
297. 265 S.W.3d 16, 18 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2008), rev'd in part en banc, 265
S.W.3d 1 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.).
298. Id.
299. Id. at 19. "Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, a state must give the same
force and effect to a judgment of a sister state that it would give to its own judgments." Id.
To avoid enforcement, a party must establish that "(1) the judgment is interlocutory, (2)
the judgment is subject to modification under the law of the rendering state, (3) the render-
ing state lacked jurisdiction, (4) the judgment was procured by fraud or penal in nature, or
(5) limitations has expired under the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code." Id. at 19-
20 (quoting Russo v. Dear, 105 S.W.3d 43, 46 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, pet. denied); TEX.
CIV. PRAC. AND REM. CODE § 16.066 (Vernon 2008)).
300. Enviropower, 265 S.W.3d at 20-21 (citing Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 668-
69 (1892)).
301. 256 S.W.3d 719 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.).
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1983, Bancorp obtained a default judgment against Prevot in Mississippi.
Under Mississippi law, a judgment is valid for seven years. When seven
years passed without payment, Bancorp filed another suit in Mississippi
state court to renew the judgment. In addition, Bancorp sought to do-
mesticate each "renewed" Mississippi judgment in Prevot's home state of
Texas by filing each judgment in a Texas state court. At no time did
Prevot timely file a post-judgment motion challenging the foreign judg-
ments, nor did he appeal the judgments. In 2005, Bancorp filed a motion
in Texas to enforce the Mississippi judgment. After a hearing, the Texas
court entered an order neither granting nor denying the motion because
the courts had lost jurisdiction.302 The court of appeals reversed, holding
that the Mississippi judgment was instantly enforceable under the UEFJA
when Bancorp filed it in a Texas court. As to the issue of jurisdiction to
enforce the judgment later, the court held that while a trial court's ple-
nary power expires thirty days after a judgment is entered, a trial court
retains the statutory and inherent power to enforce its judgment and held
the Mississippi judgment enforceable. 30 3
Cantu v. Grossman is a first-impression ruling on UEFJA venue. 30 4
Grossman obtained a Florida judgment for tortious interference with
contract, then filed suit in Harris County to enforce the Florida judgment.
Cantu objected to venue in Harris County but the trial court denied
Cantu's objection.30 5 In a case of first impression, the court of appeals
considered whether the general venue laws of Texas apply to foreign
judgments filed pursuant to the UEFJA. First, the court acknowledged
that "Texas courts have held repeatedly and consistently that the [defen-
dant's right] to be sued in the county of his residence is a valuable right of
which he may not be deprived unless [an exception applies]. '306 Second,
the Court found that the "UEFJA does not clearly indicate [an] intent to
exempt the filing of a foreign judgment from the general venue laws of
Texas. ' 30 7 The court held that Hidalgo County, where the defendant re-
sided, was the proper venue. 30 8
302. Id. at 721-22.
303. Id. at 724-29 (citing TEX. Civ. PRec. & REM. CODE § 35.003 (b) & (c) (Vernon
2002)); Walnut Equip. Leasing Co. v. Wu, 920 S.W.2d 285, 286 (Tex. 1996).
304. 251 S.W.3d 731 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. filed).
305. Id. at 734.
306. Id. at 741; see TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.002(a)(2) (Vernon 2002).
307. Cantu, 251 S.W.3d at 741.
308. Id. (citing TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.002(a)(2)).
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